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Straight Talk — Springer Nature Cancels €3.2 Billion 
IPO at the Last Minute
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NY  10011;  Phone:  973-206-8211)  <tonkery@gmail.com>  www.contentstrategies.com
The library, publishing and investment community news sources have been filled with articles and notices announc-
ing Springer Nature’s failed IPO.  What’s 
the story here?  Does this mean that Springer 
Nature is in financial trouble?  What does this 
failed IPO mean for the library community? 
Has the Open Access movement put a stake in 
the financial plans of our second largest STM 
publisher?  I am not sure that the answer is all 
that complex.  Before I tackle that issue perhaps 
a little background is necessary as this is not the 
first time an IPO has been on the table.
In 2015, Springer Nature was formed 
by the merger of publishing units from the 
Holtzbrinck Publishing Group and Springer 
Science+Business Media held by the large 
venture firm BC Partners. 
Springer is not a new company but has a 
long history of scientific publishing founded 
in 1842.  My first exposure to Springer was 
in 1973.  As a new librarian working at the 
National Library of Medicine I was given the 
task of working with the top 50 STM publishers 
and selling them on the concept of Cataloging 
in Publication.  I visited all 50 publishers and 
worked with their editorial staff to implement 
the CIP program.  One of my favorite publish-
ers was Springer.  They were an old world 
classic German publisher and I visited them 
every time I was in New York City.  The friends 
that I made there lasted for more than 25 years 
and I was fortunate enough to continue working 
with various family members during my tenure 
as President and CEO of Readmore, a library 
subscription agent based in NYC.  Every year 
for ten years that I attended the Frankfurt 
BookFair for Readmore, I was invited to the 
private dinner that Springer held for the major 
subscription agents.  Springer was a family 
run company with a great corporate culture. 
As the Springer family aged and lacked 
new leadership, the company was sold and 
fell into the hands of Bertelsmann.  Bertels-
mann owned Springer from 1998-2003 and 
basically left them alone.  They were more like 
caretakers than new owners.  With some cha-
otic changes in Bertelsmann’s management, 
the company began selling off several of its 
newer acquisitions including Springer.  In 
the spring of 2003, Springer was sold to two 
British private-equity firms Cinven and Can-
dover.  Cinven and Candover also acquired 
Kluwer Academic Publishers and merged 
the two companies.  In 2004, Derk Haank, 
the chairman of Elsevier was poached to lead 
Springer.  Cinven and Candover had a plan 
to take Springer public and with the addition 
of Kluwer Academic plus the leadership of 
Haank, the stage was set for a public offering. 
In fact, Haank was promised a huge payday 
as a condition to leave Elsevier and lead the 
new Springer.  The combined Springer and 
Kluwer revenues were sufficient to support the 
market expectation and an IPO was considered 
nearly certain.
In the end the global financial 
meltdown in 2006-7 ruined the 
Springer IPO opportunity and 
Cinven and Candover did 
the next best thing.  They 
raided Springer’s as-
sets, stripped out as 
much cash as possible, 
and borrowed heavily 
leaving Springer in 
near financial ruins and then sold 
Springer with its new debt to EQT and GIC 
in 2009.  After a short time, the next venture 
group sold Springer to BC Partners in 2013 
for €3 billion.
Since 2004, Springer has been under the 
same leadership.  Derk Haank has had to face 
different owners, changes in market conditions 
and expectations, navigate the Open Access 
movement, continue to grow the business even 
with the library attacks on the Big Deals.  He 
continued to grow the company and prosper 
independent of market conditions.  His 13 
years at the helm of Springer showed his high 
level of competence and stomach for managing 
through chaos.
The new owners BC Capital Partners soon 
decided that Springer by themselves would 
not make a strong IPO candidate primarily 
due to the heavy debt load that was still on 
Springer’s books.  They went looking for a 
partner that would greatly improve the story 
to investors, someone with blue ribbon creden-
tials and a merger partner that would improve 
the financial conditions that the market seeks 
for a successful IPO.
Within a short time, BC Partners found 
a very successful potential IPO partner and 
they convinced Stefan von Holtzbrinck of 
the benefits and serious financial rewards that 
would come from a merger of the privately 
held Holtzbrinck Publishing Group’s Nature 
Publishing Group, Palgrave Macmillan, and 
Macmillan Education.  Stefan was sold on an 
opportunity to significantly increase the value 
of his publishing units and to enjoy a very 
handsome payday.  A merger was completed 
with Holtzbrinck owning 53% of the new 
company and plans for a public offering were 
developed.  Derk Haank had been planning for 
this IPO since 2004.  His goal to run an IPO was 
finally in range.  In the end Derk did not see 
his dream fulfilled at least under his leadership. 
Working for a venture firm is always diffi-
cult as the venture organization often lacks a 
real understanding of the market but does give 
CEO’s an opportunity to achieve certain goals. 
The downside is that if you don’t achieve those 
goals, then a change of management occurs.  In 
the Springer Nature case certain targets were 
established, and Springer did not achieve 
those goals partly due to a change in 
market conditions.  Derk could no 
longer keep the wolf from his door. 
Springer Nature was left to an-
nounce Derk’s retirement.  A sad 
farewell to the one executive 
that had worked tirelessly 
to keep Springer alive and 
thriving.  But business is 
business and the owners 
wanted an IPO.  A new CEO 
from the business world was hired to deliver 
on the IPO promise.  Daniel Ropers the very 
successful founder and CEO of bol.com who 
has a sterling reputation in the investment com-
munity was brought in to orchestrate the IPO.
Now with the IPO planning back on track, 
JP Morgan and Morgan Stanley were hired 
as the global coordinators.  Bank of America, 
Merrill Lynch, BNP Paribas, Credit Suisse, 
Goldman Sachs and Societe Generale are the 
book runners.  Everything was planned for July 
2018, but then suddenly the IPO was moved 
up to the end of April.  The IPO had the best 
banks lined up to sell the offering to potential 
investors.  Normally an offering with this type 
of backing would be a slam dunk, the story 
was solid, the companies are highly profitable. 
Springer Nature posted €1.62 billion euros 
in sales last year and employs 13,000 staff.  It 
publishes 3,000 scientific journals and about 
12,000 new books a year.  Its 2017 EBITDA 
of just below €600 million euros after €564 
million in 2016 is still a solid profit return.
And yet with all that revenue and profit, the 
IPO was killed!  Why?  How could this happen? 
Is Springer Nature in trouble?  What does this 
mean to my library, my big deal, or access to 
my e-subscriptions?
First and foremost, I believe that Springer 
Nature is a solid well-run company and your 
library subscriptions are secure.  Your ebooks 
and big deal will continue.  Springer is also 
one of the largest open access publisher’s 
publishing over 550 OA titles each year and 
this is a growing area.  Unfortunately, most OA 
titles do not deliver the same level of revenue 
as a traditional subscription title.  STM titles 
published even with the Gold OA model do not 
yield the same revenue and that is not likely 
to improve soon.  Springer still obtains 95% 
of their profitability from traditional scholarly 
publishing.
There are some individuals in the library 
community that would like to think that the 
OA access movement was largely responsible 
for Springer Nature’s failed IPO.  That the 
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uncertainly of the market has cast a shadow on 
Springer Nature.  Certainly, the investment 
community is aware of the OA movement but 
when you review Springer’s renewal rates for 
their Big Deals or consider any other financial 
factor, other than a large amount of OA chatter, 
the OA access movement has done very little 
damage to Springer Nature, nor has the OA 
movement hurt the financial returns of Else-
vier’s RELX, Kluwer or Informa the owner 
of Taylor & Francis.  I would have to say 
while the OA movement is alive and well, it 
has not impacted the financial performance of 
any publicly held STM company and I don’t 
believe that the investment community was in 
any way influenced or bothered by this factor 
when considering the investment in the IPO.
What then explains the failed IPO?
I believe that there are three primary rea-
sons that the Springer Nature IPO failed. 
I believe the primary issue is the debt level. 
The IPO proceeds would have been used to 
reduce Springer Nature’s debt level down 
to 3.75 times earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation, and amortization.  Springer’s 
debt currently stands at €3 billion euros and 
too much of the IPO funds raised were going 
to be used to pay down the debt.  Why would 
an investor that is already carrying Springer 
bonds want to buy more debt or just replace one 
form of investment for another?  Springer has 
too much debt and I believe that the company 
should have renegotiated their debt with their 
banks and reduced the level down to a more 
manageable level.  Investors did not like buy-
ing debt.  Shareholders don’t like to use their 
funds to cover housekeeping items.  They often 
want their money used to expand products and 
services, for acquisitions, or to fund growth.
The second reason for the IPO failure is the 
lack of growth opportunity.  Investors while 
happy to see a well-run company that is profit-
able, always demand to see substantial growth 
potential.  A 3% growth forecast is almost 
surely a kiss of death for a deal.  It certainly 
takes any excitement out of an investment 
opportunity.  Given so much of the investment 
money chasing IPO’s these days is being used 
to invest in some form of internet idea, along 
comes Spring Nature and offers a story of 3% 
growth with a promise that it could get worse if 
the OA access movement gets out of hand.  So 
really the best growth rate an investor will ever 
see out of Springer is a disappointing 3% and 
investors must be prepared for the possibility 
that growth rate get even worse.  Not a very 
exciting story to sell investors.
Perhaps the last reason that the Springer 
Nature IPO failed is that investors were pricing 
the IPO at the bottom range of the offering. 
The bookrunners selling the IPO had to offer 
the shares at a considerable discount, below 
the price that the owners had expected.  The 
investment banks had priced the offering at 
€10.50-€14.50 range per share.  Most of the 
contracts for shares came in at the low end 
of the offering price.  The target price was 
so low that BC Partners decided not to sell 
any of their holdings and to keep their current 
investment.  This is significant because the IPO 
was going to be a big payday for BC Partners.
A weak market demand for Springer Na-
ture shares, the low IPO price per share, the 
lack of growth and high debt level all created 
the perfect storm.  The owners decided to can-
cel the IPO.  Wise decision?  Perhaps but my 
personal feeling is that the market conditions 
may continue to deteriorate, as the growth rate 
is not going to improve, and OA investment 
will not yield the same financial rate as a 
traditional journal.  I think I would have gone 
for the IPO now.  At least the debt level could 
have been addressed.
The library community can expect business 
as usual.  The IPO makes little difference to 
the everyday workings of our second largest 
publisher.  What Springer needs is a merger 
with another group that is growing rapidly and 
is profitable.  Stay tuned to see if Springer 
Nature decides to try another IPO.
Publicly owned or private publisher, 
Springer Nature still has a significant impact 
on academic libraries and that role should 
continue for years to come.  
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